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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
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Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUE CONCERNING SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WAS 
ADEQUATELY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
The State initially contends that Hollen's argument on appeal 
concerning the insufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated 
burglary charge was not "specifically" argued below and is 
therefore not preserved. See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 11-14. To 
this end, the State asserts that the issue raised on appeal 
actually presents a legal question regarding whether "a 'taking' of 
property necessitates that the actor take physical possession, f" as 
opposed to a factual question going to the sufficiency of the 
evidence. S.B.ll. The State's argument is unfounded. 
As an initial matter, Hollen properly argued the issue below 
and therefore preserved the issue for appeal. In its brief, the 
State points to Hollen's choice of words in arguing that his 
challenge was too general to be preserved. S.B.14. In particular, 
the State notes that Hollen, in challenging the aggravated robbery 
charge, stated only that it "[l]ack[ed] [] prima facie evidence." 
In arguing that Hollen's phraseology is not specific, the 
State unduly focuses on semantics and misses the content of the 
objection. Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1998) 
requires a moving party to make a "timely objection or motion, 
stating the specific ground of objection, if the objection was not 
apparent from the context.11 The sole purpose behind Rule 103(a) (1) 
is so that "the trial court has the first opportunity to address a 
claim that it erred. If the trial court already has had that 
opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver requirements is 
weakened considerably." State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 
(Utah 1991) . 
In the present case, Hollen's objection as articulated meets 
the requirements of Rule 103(a)(1). First, the objection was 
timely raised immediately after all parties rested and before the 
jury went into deliberation during a period specifically reserved 
by the trial court for such motions. R.462[73]. 
In addition, the motion and its substance as articulated by 
Hollen was both clear on its face and apparent from the context of 
the argument. As to facial clarity, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"prima facie" evidence as "[e]vidence good and sufficient on its 
face . . . [which], in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to 
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting 
the [prosecution's] claim." Black's Law Dictionary 1190 (6th ed. 
1990). While Hollen's choice of words may not have been common, 
(i.e., "the charge fails for insufficient evidence), the meaning of 
the phrase he used by definition clearly communicates the substance 
of the challenge - the evidence presented by the state "on its 
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face" is not "sufficient to establish . . . [the] facts 
constituting the [prosecution's] claim." Id. 
Yet, even if Hollen's argument was not facially clear, it was 
nonetheless apparent from its context. The very definition of 
"prima facie evidence" notwithstanding, the court made its ruling 
on Hollen's challenge after Hollen and counsel for the codefendant 
made several other sufficiency challenges to the attempted homicide 
charges (counts two and three) and the aggravated kidnaping charges 
(counts four through seven). R.462 [73-84] . After addressing at 
length the challenges to the attempted homicide and aggravated 
kidnaping charges, the court addressed the sufficiency challenge 
concerning the aggravated robbery charge (count one). R.462[84-
87]. In this context, it is disingenuous for the State to assert 
that Hollen1s sufficiency challenge concerning the aggravated 
robbery charge was not adequately specific for purposes of 
preservation. 
In fact, it is evident from the record that the court 
understood the substance of the challenge to the extent that 
addressed the claim on its merits; the court stated, "[t]hat motion 
is denied . . . as to count one." R.462[87]. Nonetheless, the 
State notes that the court invited counsel for the codefendant to 
"elaborate" upon the motion, suggesting that the court itself was 
not clear on the substance of the challenge. S.B.14. Read in 
context, the court's invitation to co-counsel seems to derive not 
from a misunderstanding of the motion on the court's part, but from 
its abundance of caution in allowing the moving parties (Hollen and 
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the codefendant) to put everything on the record that they felt 
necessary. Consequently, contrary to the State's suggestion, the 
mere fact that the trial asked co-counsel if he had " [a] nything 
else to add relative to [the sufficiency challenge concerning the 
aggravated robbery charge]" does not imply a lack of specificity 
for purposes of preservation. Indeed, the court here had the 
"first opportunity" to address the challenge and, therefore, the 
"rigid waiver requirement" called for by the State is not 
necessitated here. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. 
In addition to the foregoing, the State asserts that Hollen 
misapprehends the real issue on appeal. S.B.10. The State argues 
that the real issue is a legal question concerning whether the 
"'taking' of property necessitates the actor take physical 
possession." S.B.ll. The State also suggests that the argument 
Hollen should have made is that the information did not provide 
adequate notice of the charge against him. S.B.12. According to 
the State, therefore, Hollen waives his argument on appeal since he 
did not make the argument as framed by the State in the trial court 
below. Id. The State is incorrect. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, Hollen's argument is one of 
statutory construction which hinges on the facts of the case as 
they apply to the aggravated robbery charge as set forth in the 
information. Utah's robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(Supp. 1997), provides two distinct provisions for securing a 
robbery conviction: either thru the (1) actual "tak[ing]" of 
property or (2) the "attempt [ed] [] tak[ing]" of property by use of 
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force or fear from another's person or their presence. In this 
case, the State charged aggravated robbery, and likewise instructed 
the jury, based only on the theory that Hollen "took" property of 
the Million Dollar Saloon. R.10 (information);282-83 (jury 
instruction). The State neither charged nor instructed the jury on 
the "attempt[] to take" provision. Id. 
Hence, the question becomes, as timely argued by Hollen at 
trial, R.462[86-87]; see also supra. and in his opening brief, see 
Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 7-11, whether the evidence presented 
by the State at trial was sufficient to establish the element of 
the offense as charged, i.e., whether Hollen "took" personal 
property belonging to the Million Dollar Saloon.1 
1
 Based on its position that Hollenfs argument should have 
been framed in terms of inadequate notice provided in the 
information, the State also argues that Hollen's appeal is not 
appropriately preserved since he did not present such an issue 
"by written pretrial motion." S.B.12 (citing State v. Fulton. 
742 P.2d 1208, 1215 (Utah 1987); State v. Pierce. 782 P.2d 194, 
195 (Utah App. 1989)). 
The State's argument is meritless for several reasons. 
First, as discussed above, Hollen's argument was properly and 
timely presented as a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. 
Moreover, the challenge was made orally at trial in accord with 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b) (1998), which provides that "[a] motion 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in 
writing." 
In light of the foregoing, the cases relied on by the State 
are inapposite here for they concern challenges to the adequacy 
of an information, which must be raised "before trial by written 
motion." Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1215 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(b)(1), requiring "objections based on defects in the . . . 
information" to be raised five days before trial); see also 
Pierce, 782 P.2d at 195. 
Accordingly, contrary to the State's assertion, Hollen has 
not waived his argument on appeal simply because he did not 
present a written, pre-trial motion. He was not required to do 
so and instead raised an appropriate and timely oral motion 
during trial. 
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In sum, Hollen raised his sufficiency challenge in accord with 
all the dictates of Rule 103(a)(1), and the trial court was 
consequently afforded the opportunity to address the challenge. 
Moreover, Hollen appropriately framed the argument in terms of 
sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, the State's waiver 
argument is meritless.2 
II. THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN FAILING TO 
ESTABLISH THAT HOLLEN "TOOK" PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE MILLION 
DOLLAR SALOON. 
The State never directly responds to Hollen's argument on 
appeal, namely the insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, 
the State does not explain how the evidence establishes that Hollen 
"took" property from the Million Dollar Saloon when he never 
physically touched the money. 
Instead, the State engages in a number of arguments, none of 
which were raised by Hollen on appeal, that only peripherally touch 
on Hollen's insufficiency challenge. First, the State asserts that 
a "taking" may be proved by evidence of either an attempted or 
completed taking, and therefore the State met its burden of proof 
where the facts established that Hollen attempted to take the money 
from the Million Dollar Saloon while holding the Saloon manager at 
gunpoint. S.B.15-21. 
The State's argument does not stand since the prosecutor below 
never charged the version of aggravated robbery upon which the 
2
 The State argues as a final matter regarding preservation 
that Hollen did not establish manifest injustice, plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. In response, Hollen submits on his 
brief discussing plain error. A.B.2-4. 
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State now seeks affirmance. Rather, the State elected to pursue 
one of two distinct theories of robbery, i.e., that Hollen "took 
personal property in possession of Million Dollar Saloon." R.10. 
Noticeably absent from the information is the alternative theory of 
robbery under Utah law, namely that a person commits robbery if he 
"attempts to take" the personal property of another. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-301 (Supp. 1998) and -302 (1995) . Hollen was 
subsequently bound over on this theory alone and accordingly 
prepared his defense for trial. 
Hence, to affirm the conviction where the State did not 
establish a "taking" based on an alternate theory of robbery not 
charged by the State would be a violation of his right of due 
process, Utah Const. Art. I, §7 (general due process); United 
States Const, amend. XIV (same), and more specifically, a violation 
of his right to be apprised of the accusation against him and to 
have a copy thereof. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (securing right 
to be informed about charge); Utah Const. Art. I, § 13 ("[o]ffenses 
. . . shall be prosecuted by information"); U.S. Const, amend. VI 
("accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation"); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S.Ct. 777, 98 L.Ed.2d 864 
(1988) (notice implicates defendant's rights of due process and 
right to be informed of nature of charge). 
Moreover, the State cannot now seek to justify the conviction 
on appeal by arguing that the "take" language that it itself 
elected to charge contemplates an "attempt to take" as well. As 
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noted above, Utah's robbery statute includes two distinct 
provisions for securing a conviction, either through evidence 
establishing a taking or an attempt to take. The latter provision 
was added by the Utah legislature in 1995. Prior to that, Utah's 
robbery statute read simply, " [r]obbery is the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
301(1) (1995) . Under that statute, the State had to prove a taking 
and asportation in order to secure a robbery conviction. See, 
e.g.. State v. Roberts, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974). 
In this instance, the State likewise had to prove a taking and 
asportation in order to meet its burden of proof for the version of 
the aggravated robbery charge asserted against Hollen. However, 
the State failed to do so inasmuch as it never produced evidence 
that Hollen had any physical contact with the money from the 
Million Dollar Saloon. A.B.10 (discussing insufficiency of 
evidence) . Where the State failed both to meet its burden of proof 
and to amend the information to include the "attempts to take" 
language, the conviction necessarily fails for insufficient 
evidence. Id. 
The State alternatively suggests that the conviction should 
stand on the basis that Hollen had notice of the "attempts to take" 
provision notwithstanding the fact that it was never included in 
the information or that he was not bound based on such provision. 
S.B.21-24. Along this same vein, the State also notes that the 
jury instructions, "taken as a whole, fully and accurately informed 
the jury of the statutory elements" of aggravated robbery, 
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including the attempt language. S.B.25-26. 
As an initial matter, Hollen does not argue adequacy of the 
information and notice. Rather, his argument on appeal concerns 
the insufficiency of the information in support of the aggravated 
robbery conviction as charged in the information. A.B.7-11. 
Indeed, Hollen is of the position that he had adequate notice of 
the distinct theory of aggravated robbery that the State 
unsuccessfully sought to prove at trial. The State's attempt, 
therefore, to set up a straw man on appeal and then pull it down is 
disingenuous and avoids the real issue at hand. 
Nonetheless, even assuming the State's notice argument did 
have some bearing on the sufficiency issue, it does not merit 
affirmance here. As noted above, the robbery statute contains two 
distinct provisions from which a conviction can be secured, either 
through an actual taking or an attempt to take. The State gave 
notice by filing the information that it would proceed on the 
theory that Hollen "took" the property of the Million Dollar 
Saloon. R.10 (information). Thinking that he understood the 
aggravated robbery charge against him, and with no apparent defects 
or gaps in the information, Hollen prepared his defense 
accordingly. 
The question then becomes whether the information was 
"constitutionally adequate" under the circumstances. See State v. 
Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Utah 1991). "The right to adequate 
notice in the Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to state 
the charge with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant 
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from multiple prosecutions for the same crime and to give notice 
sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense." Id. In the 
present case, the aggravated robbery conviction cannot be affirmed 
upon an attempt theory because the State did not "charge [that 
theory of the case] with sufficient specificity." Id.; see supra 
(noting that attempt theory of robbery is distinct from an actual 
taking theory). Therefore, Hollen did not have an adequate 
opportunity to defend himself. Id. 
In this manner, the present case is distinguishable from State 
v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 446 (Utah App. 1996), wherein this court 
affirmed an incest conviction, in part, on the basis that it was 
properly charged in the information. In that case, the State did 
not include certain portions of the statutory language defining 
incest. Id. Nonetheless, this Court held that all "the elements 
of the offense" were properly alleged since the omitted statutory 
language did not "constitute a discrete element of the crime of 
incest." Id. 
In the case at bar, by contrast, the "attempts to take" 
language omitted from the information did constitute a "discrete 
element" of aggravated robbery. Id. Hence, all the elements of 
the aggravated robbery charge upon which the State seeks affirmance 
were not included in the information. Therefore, to affirm the 
conviction on that basis would amount to a violation of Hollen's 
rights under the Utah and federal constitutions. See Utah Const. 
Art. I, § 7 (general due process); Art. I, § 12 ("the accused shall 
have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the 
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accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof"); Utah Const. 
Art. I, 13 ("[o]ffenses shall be prosecuted by information"); U.S. 
Const, amend. VI (securing right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of charge). 
That the jury was instructed as to the alternate "attempts to 
take" robbery theory does not cure the constitutional problems with 
affirmance in this case. S.B.25-26. Again, Hollen was informed as 
to one theory of the aggravated robbery charge, bound over on that 
charge, and presented his defense accordingly. Informing the jury 
at the end of Hollen1s trial as to the alternate attempt theory 
does not fulfill the constitutional notice requirements because 
Hollen had already prepared and presented his defense. Hence, the 
State's argument concerning the jury instructions is unavailing. 
As a final matter, the State asserts that the conviction 
should be affirmed on the basis of invited error. S.B.26-27. 
Again, the State's argument is without merit. The doctrine of 
invited error applies only when a party intentionally misleads a 
court into error then complains of it on appeal. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
Contrary to the State's unfounded allegation in its brief, 
Hollen did not intentionally mislead the court into error by 
consciously omitting to raise the court's attention to the absence 
of the "attempts to take" language in the information. S.B.27. As 
noted above, Hollen proceeded to defend his case based on the 
theory of the aggravated robbery charge as set forth in the 
information. He argued before the court and to the jury that the 
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State failed to show that he "took" property belonging to the 
Million Dollar Saloon. R.462[86-87,132] . Such above-board 
dealings with the court can hardly be classified as a strategic and 
manipulative intent on Hollen's part to "preserve a hidden ground 
for reversal on appeal." Dunn, 850 P. 2d at 1220; cf. , State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) (" [d]efendants are [] not 
entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the 
benefit of objecting on appeal;" defendant strategically raised 
only a few evidentiary objections at trial but challenged 
admissibility of almost all evidence on appeal). Hence, the 
State's claim of invited error is unfounded and does not preclude 
reversal in this case. 
In light of the foregoing and the argument set forth in 
Hollen's opening brief, the aggravated robbery conviction is not 
supported by the evidence presented by the State at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Hollen respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient evidence. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument. 
SUBMITTED this ^/vU day of February, 1999. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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